The act of terrorism and other related crimes have been captioned under organized crimes simply because of the way they carry out their activities sometimes without been arrested. At other times, it is organized simply because of the manner in which it is carried out without much trace.
Terrorism was strange in Nigeria and Africa but recently it has become a common phenomenon. Africa was known for inter and intra states conflict, ethnicity, religious and other minor conflicts such as boundary issues.
However, today, it has taken a new dimension. In Nigeria for instance, the act of terrorism has become rampant and has taken a major toll in Nigeria. The kind of communal living in Nigeria frowned against terrorism but suddenly terrorism has become a recurrent decimal.
Nigeria has suffered from the operations of organized crime from oil bunkering to money laundering and terrorism. This cannot be totally divulged from the impact of globalization that has taken centre stage in interstate relationship globally.
Nigeria is the most populous, ethno-linguistically configured and religiously diverse nation in Africa. It is the world’s eighth largest oil exporter, the fifth largest crude oil supplier to the United States, and the country with the seventh-largest gas reserves in the world. It is a dominant sub-regional power in Africa, a major player in international oil market and a strategic country within the geopolitical calculation of the world order.
What happens in the country, particularly, in the area of internal security as being manifested in the deadly terrorist campaigns in the northern part of the country is, therefore, of significant consequences to regional stability, international security, and global economic order.
It is for this reason that this international workshop is not only strategic but timely given the current threat of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. There are currently two dominant terrorist cells which share the same fundamentalist ideology and violent operational strategy in Nigeria.
These include the ‘Jama’atu Allus Sunnah Lilda Wati Wal Jihad’ also known as ‘Boko Haram’ (Western Education is a taboo) in local parlance, and ‘Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan’ (Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa). Beyond these two well-structured cells, there are other less-organised splinter groups which are known to hide under the cover of terrorism to engage in non-terrorist related crimes.
The Boko Haram sect represents the vision and mission of a fundamentalist Islamic movement in Nigeria. Boko Haram has terrorized Nigeria in the last five years with their spate of killings and bombing especially in the northern part of Nigeria. This made them to extend to neighbouring countries such as Chad, Cameroun and Niger to carry out their nefarious activities. This has informed the newly established Joint Task Force among the neighboring countries to handle the spread and influx of people within their borders.
Cross-border and immigration crime is often highly organised and generates large profits for the criminals involved. It causes untold harm to individuals and communities and costs the tax payer billions of pounds each year in enforcement costs and lost tax revenue.
Organized crime has been defined variously by different scholars. However many of them are cautious about the definition considering the delicate nature of the changing character of association of individuals involved in criminal enterprises.
Some argue that the term is not very useful for analysing diverse activities and enterprises associated with illegal means to supply legitimate goods and services or employ illegal means to supply illicit goods.
In the old fashioned criminological analysis, organised crime as a concept was derived from the structure of mafia organisations with hierarchical structure with layers of position and corresponding tasks and powers. By definition, transnational organized crime entails criminal activity that is coordinated across national borders.
According to Abadinsky, organized crime is: Organised crime is a non-ideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social interaction, organised on a hierarchical basis, with at least three levels/ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities.
Positions in the hierarchy and positions involving functional specialization may be assigned on the basis of kinship or friendship, or rationally assigned according to skill. The positions are not dependent on the individuals occupying them at any particular time. Permanency is assumed by the members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in pursuit of its goals. It eschews competition and strives for monopoly on an industry or territorial basis.
There is a willingness to use violence and/or bribery to achieve ends or to maintain discipline. Membership is restricted, although non-members may be involved on a contingency basis. There are explicit rules, oral or written, which are enforced by sanctions that include murder.
From this definition of Abadinsky, organized crime has a group of people or criminals they recruit into the gang depending on the nature of their group.
Forms of organised crimes
Several forms of transnational criminal activity by organisations and individuals in West Africa have been reported in the literature. The major forms include:
* Corruption and money laundering in West African countries, and in Europe and the United States of America.
Human trafficking across West African countries, and from West Africa to the Middle East and Europe.
* Drug trafficking: West African countries are used as transit routes for cocaine and heroin. However, cannabis is produced in some West African countries and traded within and beyond the region.
* Arms trafficking into and within the West African region.
* Advance fee fraud with propositions emanating from some West Africa to Europe and North America.
* Internet fraud including identity theft.
* Smuggling of used cars. For example, used cars are imported from Europe into the Republic of Benin and smuggled into Nigeria.
* Smuggling of prohibited or controlled goods such as pharmaceutical psychotropic drugs, chemicals, etc.
* Piracy, especially in the Gulf of Guinea.
* Armed robbery, especially automobile-hijacking. Gangs of robbers, for example, snatch expensive cars from their owners in Nigeria which are then taken to neighbouring countries such as Benin, Togo and Chad.
* Smuggling of goods out of West Africa: diamonds from Sierra Leone through Liberia and Guinea; oil and precious stones from Nigeria; gold from Ghana;
Vices (gambling, prostitution, etc.).
* Fraudulent trade practices, including dumping of sub-standard products and misrepresentation; illicit foreign exchange transactions (including money laundering) and siphoning of assets from Africa to developing economies (for instance over-invoicing, under-invoicing, abuse of investment concessions, tax and duty evasions, etc.).
* Dumping of toxic materials.
On the one hand, the term can be used to refer to certain types of more sophisticated criminal activities embedded, in one form or another, in complex illicit markets. Arms, drug, and human trafficking are often correlated with a set of ‘enabling activities’ such as (the threat of) violence, corruption, and money laundering.
One group of authors assumes that the former constitute core activities of organized crime; another refers to the latter. In both cases the offences can usually be categorized as ‘serious crimes’. It may be more accurate to use the term ‘organized criminality’.
However, some of these aforementioned are not particularly a problem in Nigeria but terrorism, money laundering, human trafficking, drug abuse, car theft, oil bunkering, militancy and sea piracy are among the most threatening menaces in Nigeria and the surrounding states. There is a close link between terrorism and organised crime in several ways.
The effect and impact of organised crimes in Nigeria is enormous. It affects the development of the country and discourages investment. Particularly in area of insecurity, organised crime has eroded the people’s conscience.
Organised crimes has affected the free flow of divided of democracy in Nigeria particularly corruption, money laundering, human trafficking, oil theft terrorism/insurgency in Nigeria.
The consequences of organized crime for a democracy, particularly in developing and weak states, are most damaging where criminal organizations have penetrated the political domain in order to better consolidate or expand their economic opportunities and in order to limit competition.
The impact is one that follows a path of a gradual expansion of power and influence: Democracy around the globe is facing formidable challenges today, not from martial forces from outside, as we saw heretofore, but from subversive militants from within.
Democracy is infected by a pernicious affliction initiated and propagated by organized crime that gains control progressively, maybe first as only a communal criminal gang, to later transform itself into a market driven force, eventually infiltrating the legitimate government at all levels, and finally rendering the government powerless. Throughout the metamorphosis organized crime enlarges its power structure and fortifies itself as democracy atrophies or is lost altogether.
Organised crime has constituted an obstacle to democracy in Nigeria and Africa at large. Many of the stolen money were laundered abroad living the country at the mercy of poverty and unemployment. It is, however, heartwarming to know that the new administration of President Buhari Muhammadu, GCFR, has given hope to Nigeria in this regard. This is so as the Nigerian President has repeatedly emphasized his resolve to recover all Nigeria money that were stolen and taken abroad.
Legal framework against organised crime in Nigeria
Terrorism constitutes a total infringement and intentional deprivation of the citizens ‟right to life as enshrined in Section 33 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Other international human rights instruments also guarantees right to life which is a fundamental human right. Apart from the fact that terrorism is generally viewed as inhumane; it is equally a criminal act which the whole world frowns at.
On the 28th of September, 2001, Resolution 13736 was adopted by the Security Council. The said Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which obligates States to implement more effective counter-terrorism measures at the national level and to increase international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. The Resolution created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor action on this issue and to receive reports from States on measures taken.
Apart from this, eighteen universal instruments (fourteen instruments and four amendments) against international terrorism have been elaborated within the framework of the United Nations system relating to specific terrorist activities.
Member States through the General Assembly have been increasingly coordinating their counter-terrorism efforts and continued their legal norm-setting work. At the same time a number of programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system have been engaged in specific activities against terrorism; further assisting Member States in their counter-terrorism efforts.
To consolidate and enhance these activities, Member States in September, 2006 embarked upon a new phase in their counter-terrorism efforts by agreeing on a global strategy to counter terrorism.
The Strategy marks the first time that all Member States of the UN have agreed to a common strategic and operational framework to fight terrorism. Further still, there are also myriad of treaties which address different forms of terrorist practices.
Some of which are the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (1988) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997).
The above notwithstanding, the level of sabotage carried out by terrorists continues to increase on a daily basis in Africa and world over. How much havoc terrorism has done to our society economically, socially and politically remains incalculable.
Again on 21st February 2012, the Security Council met to consider matters related to peace and security in Africa, focusing on the impact of transnational organised crime on peace, security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel region.
After the meeting it issued a statement (S/PRST/2012/2) in which it: expressed concern about the serious threats to international peace and stability in different regions of the world, in particular in West Africa and the Sahel Region, posed by transnational organised crime, including illicit weapons and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as terrorism and its increasing links, in some cases, with transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.
The Council stresses that these growing international threats, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel Region, contribute to undermining governance, social and economic development and stability, and creating difficulties for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, while threatening to reverse peace-building advances in the region
Government Responses against Terrorism and Organised Crime In Nigeria
Policy is the foundation with which actions are founded. Policy measures proceed from the executive, in contrast to legislative measures which are primarily acts of parliament. The policy response to counter insurgency in Nigeria relies on military actions and government’s synergy with neighbouring countries to step up action against organized crime and insurgency.
The Nigeria government in its foreign relations is seeking the support and assistance of the United States of America and United Nations in its fight against terrorism and organized crime.
A robust counter terrorism strategy would consider the perceived threat against the country’s historical, political and socio-economic context, assess needs and identify gaps, consider options and prescribe approach which would form objective criteria for engagement.
In addition to being a confidence-building tool for stakeholders and the various defence and security actors, a clear strategy would also form a guide for military budgeting and procurement in line with identified needs, a tool for tracking military expenditure thereby promoting transparency and accountability, and a yardstick for measuring success and review where necessary (Adetula, 2015). This observation can be factored into our counterinsurgency strategies in order to block every perceived loophole in the strategy. However, the prospect is quite high with the current effort and initiatives.
This measure is very key to ameliorating the sufferings and poverty in the Land. Part of the cause of insurgency has to do with high level of poverty, lack of adequate infrastructure, unemployment and dwindling level of education.
Socio-economic measures are better assessed in the medium to long term since their impact might not be immediately felt. Such measures seek to address and eliminate conditions conducive to terrorism. It includes promoting policies aimed at addressing the root causes of terrorism, including poverty and unemployment, economic and political marginalisation, human rights abuses, corruption, and weak security institutions . Specific policies should also be developed to counter terrorist propaganda, dissuade and deter people from turning to terrorism.
The government of Nigeria is presently embarking on measures like infrastructural development of border areas and engagement with border communities to help in combating transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking, establishment of and support to Almajiri schools in northeastern Nigeria, Safe Schools Initiative, provision of irrigation and agricultural development to provide alternative livelihoods for the unemployed, sensitization to prevent radicalization of youth, and so on. These measures will only need to be strengthened so as to have an impact on the people and other tangible infrastructural development and food security.
These are measures that have to pass through the National Assembly of Nigeria to become laws and Nigeria in recent times have passed such laws to curb the activities of insurgents and other forms of terrorism in Nigeria. These laws are the foundation with which the offenders can be punished after being apprehended.
Enabling laws are important especially in relation to new and emerging threats because in a constitutional democracy, laws provide the foundation for action or legitimacy for response. In addition to existing laws, several relevant Acts have been passed in the past five years or so and may be found on the Nigerian National Assembly website.
These would include Anti-Terrorism Act, Anti-Piracy Act, Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (Prohibition) Act, etc. The legal texts are there but empirical evidence is rare on what impact the laws have had in the fight against transnational organised crime and jihadist activities, and on if the provisions of the laws are sufficient or if there are gaps that need to be filled.
Law enforcement measures
Law enforcement measures include efforts to improve the Nigeria Police Force, Customs and Immigration Services in relation to transnational organized crime, installation of detection equipment at airports and seaports, internal security and policing.
Such efforts would include extensive training of officers to confront new threats such as terrorism, improved intelligence gathering and analysis as well as their effects on prevention if any, improvement of community policing through community partnership in policing. Importantly, efforts at prevention should seek to deny terrorists access to funds, communication, materials and space with which to plan and launch their attacks.
Military measures seem to be the most potent Nigeria has depended on for a while. This is so as diplomacy and negotiation have not yielded any positive results.
This measure include deployment of the Joint Task Force and Special Forces to northeast Nigeria, advanced weapons procurement, training of military personnel in counterterrorism operations, and recently, rescue of over 700 persons, mostly women and girls, from Sambisa Forest. Budgetary implications of the military measures have been significant.
For instance, defence and security took almost 25 percent of Nigeria’s 2014 budget; in addition a supplementary budget of $1 billion was approved to support the fight against Boko Haram in the northeast. However, this measure is yielding positive outcome in northeast especially with the assumption of President Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR, as the Head of State. Nigeria is gaining and seeing the rewards of the monies expended on military and weapons. It is expected that with the tempo of military measures by the Nigeria Military, the Presidential directive to the Nigerian Military to bring insurgency to an end within three months will be a reality.
International convention against money laundering
All of these money laundering activities occur in the pan-Atlantic. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental body of 36 member countries and the international lead on such crimes. FATF’s purpose is to develop and promote policies at national and international levels and to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
FATF estimates that criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6% of global gross domestic product (GDP), with 2.7% ($1.6 trillion) laundered through a variety of methods, including precious metals, phony off shores and fronts, and new e-gambling and nonbank typologies.
The FATF’s June 2013 “blacklist” of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories included Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as would be expected.
However, several African countries now appear on the Not Sufficiently Compliant Countries and Territories list, including Nigeria, Kenya, Ethopia, Yemen, and Tanzania.
In South America, Argentina and Bolivia keep moving on and off the list of non-cooperative countries, and as of this writing have moved to “improving and monitoring” status.
With the arrival of tons of drugs from powerful Latin DTOs, and their governments rife with corruption, money laundering is surely proliferating in West Africa.
Until now, little data was available on laundering in the region. However, a new study commissioned by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) is shedding much needed light on these activities. The GIABA study was conducted in 2011 on 10 West African states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
Although focused on money laundering through tax fraud, many important statistics emerged from the research. For instance, although West Africa’s population of 300 million is six times greater than that of South Africa, the latter’s GDP is greater than that of the former, illustrating the region’s dire financial situation.
The cash-based economy of West Africa and its porous borders also make the region highly vulnerable to money laundering, especially bulk cash smuggling. Criminals are also corrupting bank managers and personnel, and engaged in forgery of official documents, allowing them to bypass the few financial oversight processes in place.
As in all countries, money laundering damages the licit economy and further pushes countries to the brink of failure.
A 2013 GIABA report entitled: The Nexus between Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWS) and Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa takes a unique look at the connection between the illegal weapons trade and ML/TF in the region. According to this report, there are an estimated 8 million small arms and light weapons, or SALWs, such as AK-47s, rifles and pistols, in the hands of state and non-state actors in West Africa.
Illicit trafficking in SALW is a profitable business venture due to high demand and the ease of moving weapons across borders. Since weapons are manufactured external to the region, they all must be imported internationally.
Although the report does not establish a connection directly with Central or South America, the region certainly could be a conduit to the trade and could add weapons to drug shipments along thriving trafficking routes. The GIABA indicates SALW procurement from Côte d’Ivoire, a major transhipment area for Latin American drugs into Europe, is directly connected to the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Russia.
SALW-related money laundering is conducted through local and international banks, real estate investments, and small retail business. This interesting graphic from the GIABA report illustrates connections between SALW and money laundering and terrorism financing in West Africa.
There is a close affinity between terrorism, money laundering and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The uncontrolled influx of small arms was the foundation for crisis prone environment in Nigeria that graduated into militancy and then full blown terrorism.
Challenges of Counter Terrorism
Counterterrorism is broadly defined as the sum total of state’s concern with the identification, prevention and nullification of the effects of terrorist outrage, conducted through skillful intelligence acquisition, sensible precautions, planning and efficient anti-terrorist capability, and designed to restore law and order.
As a process that requires the selection of appropriate responses to unique situations, the crucial challenge often faced by policy makers rests on the question of the most appropriate strategy to adopt to suit a particular terrorist situation without violating international and human rights law.
Herein lays the challenge confronting the Nigerian law enforcement agents as components of the counter terrorism framework of the country.
Until the emergence of terrorism in 2009, the Nigerian security space has experienced several religious, industrial, social and political crises which were often short-lived and dealt with within the law enforcement mandate of the Nigeria Police.
In isolated cases, such internal security operations were undertaken with assistance of the military under the principle and practice of Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA) or Military Assistance to Civil Power (MACP) as recognised in the Nigerian Constitution.
Often, the military involvement in such operations was also short-lived as they transfer command and control to the police immediately law and order was restored.
Accordingly, some analysts believe that the Nigeria Police have relative experience in the management of ethnic, political and religious violence and that they have been successful within their existing institutional and human capacity to achieve a reasonable level of success in combating these sets of security challenges.
While this assertion may be difficult to scientifically verify as there is currently, no standard professional evaluation instrument within the Nigerian policing system to establish the level of police proficiency in this regard, in relation to terrorism, there is a consensus of opinion that being a new internal security trend, the Nigeria Police and indeed, the Nigerian security network lack the professional experience to expertly counter it within existing best international practices and within the dictates of rule of law.
Late Gen. Andrew Azazi (rtd), the former National Security Adviser whose Office coordinated the counter terrorism operations of Nigeria alluded to this fact when in an address to pressmen shortly after an emergency National Council of State meeting summoned to review national security following the August, 2011 bombing of the UN House in Abuja observed that terrorism is a relatively new security challenge which neither the nation nor the security agencies are prepared for.
He hinted on the need to rejig the security architecture of the nation in order to effectively counter terrorism, while noting that it will take a while for the nation and security agencies to attain the operational capacity and professional orientation needed to pursue and effectively counter terrorism campaign within the dictates of best international practices.
The Nigerian counter terrorism experiment is an admixture of military and law enforcement strategies. It is woven around the concept of ‘Joint Task Force’ (JTF). The components of JTF are drawn from the military, police and State Security Service, but the command and control is exclusively vested in the military.
The implication is that counter terrorism initiatives of the country are led by the military, guided by military culture, and predominantly regulated by military laws and practices in relation to RoE and treatment of arrested terrorist suspects, while the law enforcement components are more or less playing back-up roles or what could be described as ‘second-fiddle’ role.
Not being the lead agency, it is a challenge for the Police to bring law enforcement standards to bear in an operational theatre in which the military plays the lead role, and in which most often, the military operate independent of other components of the JTF, take custody and debrief arrested suspects in line with military laws and practice, or even in some instances engage suspects with clear military intent, unlike the intent of the police which rests on use of minimum force for purpose of incapacitating, arresting and bringing to justice any arrested suspect.
Aside the challenges that arise from the counter terrorism architecture of Nigeria, a major challenge confronting law enforcement agents in relation to bringing terrorist elements to justice borders on security of witnesses. The nation’s legal framework in relation to witness protection is weak. And for a matter touching on terrorism, it is often difficult to gain the attendance of vital witnesses in courts to prosecute terrorist offenders for fear of reprisal attacks by the terror network.
In similar vein, judges’ protection in high-profile cases like terrorism trials also poses another tranche of challenge to law enforcement agents. This is because judges may be exposed to dangers and threats from terrorist network and, hence, requires special protection arrangement to give the confidence needed for an uninhibited trial process.
Organized crime and terrorism are no longer new in Nigeria and the contemporary world. They wreck severe havoc on both human and material resources. There are legal frameworks against terrorism and other forms of organized crimes in Nigeria.
What is left to be done is proper enforcement of the enabling laws. The courts must be able to fast track their trials to deliver judgments early enough in order to act as deterrent to others. There are trials that have been on for over two years that till date there is no judgment; yet matters of this sort are not supposed to be allowed to linger for too long before judgment is delivered.
It is important to mention that the approach of the Nigeria Police in tackling the challenges of organised crime and terrorism has been to shift emphasis from reactive policing strategies to intelligence-led policing strategy, enhance our investigative and prosecutorial competence, sharpen our operational competence, fashion a professional synergy with other components of the JTF and explore best international practices towards management of internal security challenges of the nature posed by organised crime and terrorism.
Our conviction is that it is only when these initiatives are fully optimised that the professional ability of the Nigeria Police Force to attain its counter terrorism mandate within the rule of law and within international best practices can be guaranteed.
From the intelligence perspective, it is our assumption that Intelligence-led policing aids in the identification of patterns of crime and identification and profiling of targeted offenders and their criminal enterprise. It also aids in the judicious utilization and prioritization of police resources towards crime prevention and operational planning while engendering efficient crime prevention and reduction outcomes.
The application of Intelligence-led Policing strategies discourages abuse of powers of arrest and pre-trial detention to the extent that police actions that usually account for pre-trial detentions would have been initiated and possibly completed through the application of discreet investigation element of intelligence practices before the arrest of the suspect.
The principle of intelligence-led policing describes how knowledge and understanding of criminal threats are used to drive law enforcement actions in response to threat of organised crimes.
To improve our overall responses therefore, we, as security professionals, must first improve our knowledge of intelligence and then use that to dissect organised crimes, and enhance operational efforts in the highest priority area, which as at today puts terrorism at the top within the Nigerian internal security space and in the global crime chart.
In order to do this in the most professional manner, operatives must constantly be exposed to the highest available level of training to grapple with the dynamics of the intelligence world. This is expedient because intelligence gathering is an intellectually-demanding and technology-driven venture which demands constant training and re-training.
The current challenge of Boko Haram is a phase in Nigeria’s evolutionary history. While this phase will pass, there are concerns as to whether the international community can aid the police in the development of sound professional capacity to identify indicators of future threats early enough through intelligence and deal with such decisively and within rule of law before it snowballs into another major internal security challenge that will warrant military involvement and clash between military law and civil/criminal law with attendant human rights violations.
Secondly, is whether the international community can also demonstrate the will to build a professionally competent Police Force that will play its prime role within the internal security profile prior to, during and after terrorism challenges, when the military must have withdrawn from the terrorist theatre and turn over the responsibility of law and order to the civil Police.
It is my hope that this forum will build a strong network that will complement local law enforcement initiatives as we struggle to cope with public pressure and pressure of the law in our law enforcement functions in relation to organized crime, terrorism and other crimes.
I thank you all
Ogunsakin, Assistant Inspector General of Police, delivered this paper at the 33rd International symposium on economic crime at Jesus College, University of Cambridge