The controversy over $9.6billion judgment debt against Nigeria deepened on Saturday following a revelation that the list of those involved in the negotiation of the contract was submitted to an Arbitration Tribunal in London
The founder of Process and Industrial Developments (P&ID), Michael Quinn admitted to have had audience with the late President Umaru Yar’Adua, ex-Minister of Petroleum Resources, Dr. Rilwanu Lukman, a former Group Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Shehu Ladan and 15 others over the Gas Supply and Processing Agreement (GSPA).
He also said he wrote to ex-President Goodluck Jonathan, a former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Mrs. Diezani Alison-Madueke and a former Special Adviser to President on Petroleum Matters, Dr. Emmanuel Egbogah on certain developments on the failed project.
Besides, he admitted that the Arbitration, which led to the $9.6billion judgment debt, was entered into by the Jonathan administration with the knowledge of Diezani.
But his revelation does not mean that those mentioned were involved in any wrong doing in the deal.
Quinn said that on 19 September 2012 he wrote to the Minister for Petroleum Resources nominating P&ID’s choice of Arbitrator, the Sir Anthony Evans.
He said that on 30 November 2012 the Government wrote to inform P&ID of the appointment of Chief Bayo Ojo as the Government’s arbitrator.
He spoke of a meeting earlier on 12 October 2012 at the “office of the Government’, but would not want to divulge what transpired.
He listed the key actors/ players in the contract in his witness statement tabled before the Arbitration Tribunal.
THOSE WHO KNEW ABOUT THE CONTRACT
The late President Umaru Yar’Adua
Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan
The late former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Dr. Rilwan Lukman
Ex-Minister of State for Energy (Gas), Mr. Olatunde Odusina
Ex-Minister of Petroleum Resources, Mrs. Alison Madueke
Ex-Special Adviser to President on Petroleum Matters, Dr. Emmanuel Egbogah
Ex-GMD of NNPC, Shehu Ladan
NNPC GMDs in 2011 and 2012
NNPC
NAPIMS
Addax Petroleum
Neil Hitchcock
He said the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for the project was done on July 22, 2009.
Although the document was filed at the tribunal in 2014, it was learnt that it is part of the ongoing investigation by the Office of the Inspector-General of Police, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA).
The three institutions were mandated by President Muhammadu Buhari to look into the “criminal conspiracy” behind the award of the $9.6billion judgment.
The witness statement of Quinn reads in part:
“I am fully authorized to make this statement in support of P&ID’s claims in the arbitration commenced against the Government. I make this statement on the basis of my own knowledge of the events I describe, whether that be from my direct participation in them or from discussing them contemporaneously with my colleagues, and in particular Neil Hitchcock, the Project Director of P&ID, and my business partner Brendan Cahill.?
“The GSPA represented a substantial infrastructure project involving anticipated profits of $5 to $6 billion for P&ID over a 20 year period. It was the culmination of years of research by my team of engineers into the production of clean energy from natural gas.
“I believe that it was also a ground-breaking venture of great significance to the Nigerian economy which would have benefited millions of ordinary Nigerians by boosting the domestic electricity supply by the productive utilization of existing natural gas reserves. Had the GSPA been implemented in accordance with its terms the national power output would have increased by over 2,000 MW.
“To place this increase in context, to my knowledge the highest peak power output ever recorded in Nigeria was 4,349.7 MW, on 17 December 2012.?
“The GSPA would also have been the high point of my own career in Nigerian business which spans in excess of 30 years and encompasses dozens of large scale projects ?
“In this witness statement I wish to explain how the GSPA came about, and why P&ID was ultimately prevented from implementing it. ?
“It was against this background, in 2006, that P&ID and P&ID Nigeria were incorporated and that we started to work in earnest on a gas project (“the Project”). ?
“We set about the necessary preparatory engineering work required to construct a gas stripping plant capable of processing 400 MMSCuFD4 of Wet Gas and a polymer grade propylene plant capable of producing 250,000 metric tons per annum of polymer grade propylene.?
“The idea was that we would obtain Wet Gas and process it to remove the NGLs (principally propane and butane).
“The propane would be used as feedstock for the polymer grade polypropylene plant, and the remaining NGLs could be sold, either domestically or on international markets. The Lean Gas could be sold for domestic power generation.”
Quinn explained how and why he met the late President Umaru Yar’Adua and other key actors.
THOSE WHO KNEW ABOUT THE PROJECT
Engineer Goni Sheikh,(then Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum Resources)
Mrs. Grace Taiga, the Legal Director of the Ministry
Dr. Ibrahim, Ministry’s Head of Policy
Dr. Ogwu Jones (Department of Petroleum Resources)
Mr. Taofiq Tijani, who was at this stage the Technical Assistant to the Minister, Engineer Ikejiani, the Special Technical Adviser to the Minister,
Dr. Labi Ajibade, the Manager of Gas of NAPIMS,
Dry David Ige, the Group General Manager/Special Technical Adviser to NNPC (General Executive Director, Power and Gas, NNPC)
Mr. Sunday Babalola of the DPR,
Mrs. Uno Adeniji, the General Manager of Planning, Gas and Petroleum of NNPC,
Mr. Umar, Manager Gas and Petroleum, NNPC,
Mr. Nuhu Tizhe, the Technical Adviser to the Group Managing Director of NNPC,
Mrs. Belgore, the Assistant Legal Adviser to the Minister,
Mr. Debo Spaine of Addax.
Mohammed Kuchazi (P&ID)
He said: “When we first started to work on the Project, we had envisaged that we might build the Gas Processing Facilities in the Lagos area. There are a number of natural gas fields off the coast of Nigeria in the area adjacent to Lagos, which could easily have supplied more than enough Wet Gas for the Project.
“As in the case of the Lagos area, there were numerous natural gas fields off the coast of Calabar, such as those contained in concessions, OML (meaning “Oil Mining Licence”) 123 and OML 67. OML 123 is operated by Addax Petroleum and OML 67 is operated by Exxon Mobil.
“From information available in the public domain and from our own researches it was clear that there was more than enough Wet Gas off the coast of Calabar to support a gas stripping and propylene plant operation in the Calabar area processing a Wet Gas throughput of 400 MMSCuFD We also became aware that the Government had initiated the building of a pipeline from OML 123 to Calabar (the Adanga Pipeline).
“At this stage we felt that we were in an excellent position to make a persuasive case to the Government to enter into an agreement to implement the Project.
“The President of Nigeria at that time was the late President Yar’Adua. He was also the Minister of Petroleum Resources, although he later appointed a separate Minister.
“I first broached the Project with the then Permanent Secretary to Government at the State House. He was very impressed by the Project and suggested we should put forward a proposal to the President in his capacity as Minister of Petroleum Resources. The Permanent Secretary also proposed that I should seek a meeting with the President.
“At the time of our proposal the Special Adviser to the President on Energy and Strategic Matters was Dr. Rilwanu Lukman. I also approached Dr. Lukman and discussed the project with him. He was very supportive of the Project and endorsed our decision to put the project to the President.
“Thus on 7 August 2008 P&ID wrote to the late President Yar’Adua with a formal proposal for the Project to be implemented.
“I was subsequently invited to meet the President. At our meeting I explained the problems and the proposed solution presented by the Project. The President was favourably disposed towards the Project. As a result it was arranged a presentation would be made to the Minister of State at the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, who was the President’s No 2 in the Ministry. We made the presentation to Mr. Odusina and the Ministry, as directed, in October 2008.
The Special Adviser, Dr. Lukman, was aware of the oil and gas sector construction expertise of the principals of P&ID, due to our leading role in the Butanization Project, some 15 years previously, which is referred to at paragraph 13 above.
“As a result of Dr. Lukman’s prior experience of me and my engineers during the Butanization Project, I believe that he, and therefore the Government, were confident in our abilities to undertake and complete complex Natural Gas-related projects.
“On 18 December 2008 Dr. Lukman was for the second time appointed the Honourable Minister of Petroleum Resources. In early 2009 the Minister directed that P&ID’s proposal be further examined by the Government, and we were requested by Engineer Taofiq Tijani, the Special Technical Adviser to the Minister, to bring the proposal to the office of the Honourable Minister for Petroleum Resources (see letter from Engineer Tijani at pages 70 to 71 of MQ1).
“We made several further presentations. A copy of the presentation, as forwarded to the Minister, Dr. Lukman, by letter dated 24 February 2009
“In summary our proposal was that we would take Wet Gas free of charge from the Government, process it to produce Lean Gas, and return the Lean Gas to the Government free of charge to be fed into the national power grid, with the capacity to generate over 2,000 additional megawatts of electricity for the economy. The idea was for P&ID to generate revenue (and profit) from the NGLs.
“There would be two phases. Phase 1 would be the construction by P&ID of the gas stripping plant which would separate the NGLs from Wet Gas, at the end of which process would emerge, amongst other by-products, propane, butane, condensate and Lean Gas. The propane, butane and condensate would be sold on the international markets for P&ID’s account, and the Lean Gas delivered to the Government free of charge. Phase 1 was planned to take two years to implement after the grant of the necessary approvals by the Government.
Phase two would be the construction by P&ID of the polymer grade propylene plant. Once constructed it would use the propane produced by the gas stripping plant as a feedstock for the propylene plant to produce polymer grade propylene for sale on international markets. Polymer grade propylene is a valuable industrial feedstock for the manufacture of various different products, and would be expected to achieve a significantly higher price than the Propane. Lean Gas would continue to be delivered to the Government free of charge. Phase 2 was planned to take an additional 15 months to implement.
The reason for the 2 phases set out in the Proposal was to ensure the earliest possible date for the commencement of delivery to the Government of Lean Gas.”
The P&ID founder also claimed that a Technical Working Committee was raised by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and his company worked with them.
He added: “On 31 March 2009 we were invited for discussions with the technical working team to the Ministry (“the Technical Working Team”). The Technical Working Team set about a review of P&ID’s proposal.
“During the review P&ID was required to attend meetings with the Technical Working Team. For instance, P&ID was invited to a meeting on 1 April 2009 (page 95 of MQ1) and a further meeting on 9 June 2009 (page 96 of MQ1). The Technical Working Team was interested, in particular, to learn about P&ID’s accumulated knowledge of the precise engineering and technical requirements of the various technologies and engineering solutions required to implement the Project. P&ID had already examined, and satisfied itself as to, the feasibility of the Project, and was therefore well advanced in its thinking and detailed engineering development.
“I wrote to Dr. Ibrahim, the Ministry’s Head of Policy, on 11 June 2009 about this and other matters arising from the meetings with the Technical Working Team. It was agreed that the Project would be limited, for the time being, to the construction of a gas stripping plant. It was felt that this would expedite the Project, thereby leading to the earliest supply to Government of Lean Gas.
“We also discussed with the Technical Working Team the concept of 2 separate production trains. As I stated in my letter of 11 June 2009 (pages 97 to 98 of MQ1), this had been provided for in the engineering designs for the Project in order to achieve “time of the essence” implementation. It was perceived also that this would ensure continued supply of Lean Gas to the Government if 1 of the 2 trains was for any reason put out of action for a period of time.
The use of 2 process trains also enabled the delivery of Wet Gas by the Government to be staggered into 2 phases. It was envisaged at this time that each phase would comprise about 180-200 MMSCuFD although in the event the GSPA provided that Phase 1 was 150 MMSCuFD and Phase 2 was 250 MMSCuFD.
“There were discussions about the possible locations from which to source Wet Gas for the Project. On 15 June I wrote to the Honourable Minister to explain the potential benefits of using, for Phase 1, the 180-200 MMSCuFD of Wet Gas which was at that time being flared by Addax Petroleum off the coast of the Calabar in a concession known as OML 123.”
He said the collaboration with the Technical Team led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on July 22, 2009.
He said: “The outcome of the review by the Technical Working Team was positive, and on 22 July 2009 a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) was executed by the Minister, Dr. Lukman, and P&ID (pages 100 to 110 of MQ1).
The recitals to the MOU read as follows:
(a) The Government holds as a key strategic objective, the production of adequate quantities of natural gas to satisfy the power generation and other domestic uses needed for national economic growth.
(b) The Government of Nigeria has substantial undiscovered potential gas reserves, discovered but undeveloped gas reserves, developed gas reserves and associated gas reserves in its onshore and offshore territories largely in acreage allocated to international and indigenous operators.
(c) The Government through the NNPC owns approximately fifty-seven (57) percent of the gas resources in acreage allocated to the international operators.
(d) The Government desires to develop, construct and operate gas resources at optimal capacity to meet the growth in gas demand at the various level of the economy including domestic, regional and export market.
(e) The Government is currently engaged in the development of a strategic natural gas policy, to ensure the smooth achievement of its objective for the effective development of gas in Nigeria to meet short term supply requirement for power generation;
(f) The Government shall procure that NNPC shall work with Process and Industrial Developments Limited (P&ID) in the implementation and execution of the Accelerated Gas development Project (hereinafter referred to as the Project);
(g) The Government has explored viable structures that could be used to meet the highlighted objectives and considered Process and Industrial Developments Limited as capable of implementing and executing the Project;
(h) The Government has identified certain number of oil/gas flared points and desires to eliminate gas flaring and wishes to set up a domestic LPG production base as well as make the lean gas produced available for various other domestic use.
(i) P&ID hereby undertakes to possess the requisite technology and competence for the fast track development of the gas project, thereby assisting in the realization of the Government’s objectives;
(j) P&ID has undertaken all necessary studies, including the identification of suitable associated and non-associated gas fields and is ready to commence a fast track development campaign to produce gas as stated herein. ?18
(k) The Parties are entering into this MOU to establish the framework and set out the principles under which the Parties intend to enter into a definitive agreement to carry out the desired objectives of the Parties.
“The MOU did not oblige either party to go ahead with the Project, but envisaged (as per recital (k) above) a subsequent “definitive agreement to carry out the desired objectives of the Parties”.
“Clause 3 b. of the MOU provided for 2 process streams: “P&ID will construct and incorporate two process streams with a total capacity of 400 MMSCuFD together with all utilities and storage facilities at Calabar.”
I should point out that it was in fact the Nigerian P&ID entity which was a party to the MOU. However, clause 15 of the MOU provided that any Party could assign its rights and obligations to an “Affiliate”. An “Affiliate”, as defined in the MOU, was not limited to Nigerian entities.
“The execution of the MOU accelerated the preparations for the implementation of the Project.
“A Joint Operating Committee (“JOC”) was set up pursuant to Clause 8 a) of the MOU. By letter dated 5 August 2009 (page 111 of MQ1), P&ID nominated Mohammed Kuchazi and I as the P&ID representatives on the JOC. The representatives of the Ministry were MM Ibrahim, Head of Policy, and Grace Taiga, Legal Director. NNPC were also represented on the JOC.
“By letter dated 11 August 2009 (pages 112 to 113 of MQ1) the Government invited P&ID’s representatives to an inaugural meeting of the JOC to be held on 18 August 2009. The Government’s letter stated that “The JOC will be expected to issue firm terms of reference including commercial terms and timelines required to pursue all activities towards the successful implementation of the project”.
On 12 August 2009 P&ID wrote to the Office of the Honourable Minister, accepting the invitation to attend the inaugural meeting of the JOC, and reiterating the “Commercial Terms” as follows: “the Government shall deliver to the Calabar site boundary, 400 MMSCuFD of Associated Gas having a minimum C3 (Propane) content of 3.5% mol and C4 (Butane) of 1.8% mole at No Cost, other than a nominal transmission fee (to be agreed). In turn, P&ID will process the gas, recompress the residual C1 and C2 (pipeline quality lean gas), representing approximately 85% of the wet gas feed, and make it available, for power generation, at the Calabar site boundary at No Cost to the Government.”
“By letter dated 2 September 2009 Neil Hitchcock of P&ID notified NNPC that Mohammed Kuchazi and I had been nominated to the Joint Operations Committee (page 116 of MQ1).
“A series of meetings commenced, some of which included ‘stakeholders’, such as P&ID, the Government and Addax, some of which were between P&ID and Addax, and, I believe, some of which were between the Government and Addax. For instance, a stakeholders’ meeting, involving Addax, P&ID and the Government, was held on 23 September 2009, and P&ID subsequently met with Addax Petroleum on 14 October 2009.
“By letter dated 6 November 2009 Engineer Taofiq Tijani, technical adviser to the Ministry, invited me to a further meeting on 12 November 2009 with Addax Petroleum and the Government to “progress discussions on the subject matter to enable you commence implementation of the project soonest” (page 117 of MQ1). At that meeting (which actually took place on 13 November 2009) Engineer Tijani, Dr. Jones Ogwu and Mrs. Grace Taiga attended on behalf of the Government, Debo Spaine attended on behalf of Addax, and Neil Hitchcock and I attended on behalf of P&ID. Neil Hitchcock’s note of that meeting (which actually took place on Friday 13 November 2009) is at pages 118 to 119 of MQ1.
The meeting of 13 November 2009 was chaired by Engineer Tijani. At the meeting, Engineer Tijani intimated to Addax Petroleum that the domestic obligation to supply to Government of 100 MMSCuFD of gas would be taken up by P&ID; Addax Petroleum confirmed their willingness to deliver 100 MMSCuFD of natural gas from the 168 MMSCuFD of Wet Gas that they were currently flaring to the P&ID site at Calabar via pipeline presently being constructed offshore from Adanga (in OML 123) to comply with its domestic obligations.
“Dr. Ogwu Jones, of the Department of Petroleum Resources, asked if Addax Petroleum would voluntarily increase its domestic obligations to 150 ? MMSCuFD, but Addax Petroleum replied that they needed the remaining gas for reinjection and utility power; P&ID pointed out that it would now be necessary for Addax Petroleum to reconfirm their own data to P&ID in order to clarify the composition quality and volumes of the presently flared gas from OML123; ? P&ID pointed out that the agreement with the Government was based on a supply of Wet Gas with a minimum propane content of 3.5% mol and a minimum Butane content of 1.8% mol. A copy of the draft GSPA was given by the Director of Legal of the Ministry to Addax Petroleum in order to show Addax Petroleum the specifications for the Wet Gas to be supplied;
“It was agreed that Engineer Tijani would set up a meeting the following week with NAPIMS and Addax Petroleum to inform them of the developments and receive their inputs.
“Just prior to the meeting of 13 November 2009, by letter dated 10 November 2009, Dr. Ibrahim informed me that Dr. Lukman had directed that the stakeholders should reconvene at a meeting on 24 November 2009 (page 120 of MQ1). The letter stated: “Your organisation is expected to send two high-level nominees as [a] very important and crucial decision will be taken”.
“The Government sent a first draft of the GSPA to us on 18 November 2009 (see letter dated 18 November 2009 from Mrs. Grace Taiga, the Legal Director for the Honourable Minister, at page 121 of MQ1). The draft was subjected to further negotiations, during the course of which, amongst many other changes, the BVI P&ID entity replaced P&ID Nigeria as the contracting party.
A further stakeholders’ meeting took place on 24 November 2009. ?On 1 December 2009 Dr. Ibrahim wrote on behalf of the Government stating that the Minister, Dr. Lukman, had “directed that all stakeholders Fast-track the processes to enable the signing of Definitive Agreements leading to commencement of projects”. Dr. Ibrahim added: “It is imperative to stress once again the importance of these projects to the socio-economic development of our beloved nation, hence the absolute necessity to ensure adherence by all parties to the agreed deadline” (page 122 of MQ1).
“At the request of the Government, a Letter of Comfort dated 8 December 2009 was obtained by P&ID from an associated company, Industrial Consultants (International) Limited, to remain in effect for 3 years from the date of execution of a final contract, pursuant to which ICIL undertook to provide the finance for the construction of further pipeline of up to 70 km to join up to the Adanga Pipeline.
On or around 17th December 2010 Dr. Ibrahim sent his final observations on the draft GSPA to the Minister. A copy of these observations was subsequently provided to me (pages 125 to 126 of MQ1) in order to obtain my comments upon them. In those observations there was no mention of any objection to the use of the BVI Company as the contracting party. Nor was any such objection made during the negotiations prior to that point. ?. On 11 January 2010, the GSPA was executed by me on behalf of P&ID and Dr. Lukman on behalf of the Government.
“The day after the signing of the GSPA, on 12 January 2010, I wrote to the Minister on behalf of P&ID to inform him that P&ID wished to commence work at once, and wished “to put in place all necessary modalities as soon as possible, with both Addax Petroleum and Exxon Mobil, in order to ensure the timely delivery of the currently flared Wet Gas for the project” (page 152 of MQ1). Given that P&ID had no contractual relationship with the IOCs, I requested the support and co-operation of NNPC, NAPIMS6, and the Director of the DPR to assist in finalizing these arrangements with the IOCs.
“I was keen to implement the GSPA as soon as possible. Moreover, although I was aware, of course, that the Government had, to all intents and purposes, access to virtually unlimited supplies of Natural Gas in the vicinity of Calabar, I wished to minimize any delay which might be caused by the operators of the 2 concessions that had been identified as likely sources of Wet Gas for the project. P&ID required from the Government certain up to date information which would be critical to the construction of the gas processing facility which P&ID would be building in Calabar to strip the Wet Gas.
“For instance, the precise make-up of the Wet Gas (which was also relevant to the Government’s contractual obligations to supply Wet Gas with a minimum propane and butane content) and the pressure at which it would be delivered into the gas pipeline which would transport it to Calabar. Therefore I thought that it would be important for the Government to ensure that NNPC, DPR and NAPIMS engage with Addax Petroleum and Exxon Mobil as soon as possible in order to get things moving.
“The Legal Director to the Minister wrote to the Director of the DPR on 15 January 2010, just a few days after the execution of the GSPA , stating that the Minister, Dr. Lukman, had approved the agreement, and directing the DPR to “ensure implementation” (page 153 of MQ1).
“On the same day, 15 January 2010, the Legal Director of the Ministry sent a copy of the GSPA to the Group General Manager of NAPIMS, and indicated to the National Petroleum Investment Management Services, a directorate of NNPC responsible for managing the Government’s interests in the oil and gas industry.
The Group General Manager of NAPIMS that the Minister had approved the Agreement (page 254 of MQ1). Copies of these 2 letters of 15 January 2010 were provided to P&ID by the Ministry in order to keep us informed of the Government’s steps to implement the GSPA.
“On 28 January 2010 the Ministry convened a stakeholders’ meeting for 9 February 2010, to be chaired by the Minister (page 155 of MQ1). I attended on behalf of P&ID.
“On 16 February 2010 I received a letter from the Ministry seeking my written acceptance of a minor change to the GSPA relating to the “Pioneer Status” of the project, to which I responded affirmatively by my letter of the following day (page 156 of MQ1).
“In the meantime, the site for the onshore plant at Calabar for the construction of the gas stripping plant and gas storage facilities had been selected by P&ID and secured from the Government of Cross River State. On 1 February 2010 Mr. Hitchcock wrote to the Governor of Calabar requesting the formal allocation of the land upon which the plant would be constructed (pages 157 to 158 of MQ1). On 16 February 2010 approval was granted, by the Government of Cross River State, to P&ID, for the allocation of Parcels 1 & 2 of the Energy City (Industrial) at Adiabo in Odukpani Local Government Area, containing an area of about 50.662 hectares of land, for the industrial use of P&ID (pages 159 to 160 of MQ1).
“On 14 May 2010, I wrote to NNPC to update it on the progress made by P&ID. I pointed out that all of the project finance was in place, 90% of the engineering designs had been completed, a 50 hectare site had been allocated to P&ID by the Cross Rivers State Government, and that Addax Petroleum had confirmed to the DPR its readiness to supply to P&ID the Wet Gas that it was at that time flaring in OML 123 in time for Phase 1 of the Project as set out in the GSPA. I asked the Group Managing Director of NNPC to authorize NAPIMS to oversee and conclude the necessary arrangements between P&ID and Addax, by which I meant the engineering logistics of delivery of the Wet Gas for Phase 1 from Addax, to enable work to proceed on the gas processing facility.
“I understand, from a copy of my letter endorsed in manuscript on 14 May 2010 by Shehu Ladan, the then Group Managing Director of NNPC, that NNPC so instructed NAPIMS straight away. The annotation states: “Please proceed as prayed and appraise me subsequently”. This was provided to us by the Group Managing Director himself, in order to assure us that NNPC were taking steps to implement the GSPA.
“I was therefore surprised when an article in the edition of the “This Day” newspaper of 6 June 2010 (page 163 of MQ1) stated that the Government was set to sign another gas supply agreement with Addax Petroleum in respect of the Calabar/Adanga pipeline gas. I wrote to the Minister on 21 July 2010 and copied in the Special Adviser to the President on Petroleum Matters, Dr. Emmanuel Egbogah, highlighting the media reports and seeking specific assurance in view of the confusion these reports were creating with our shareholders and suppliers (pages 164 to 165 of MQ1).
The Government responded by calling a Ministerial Stakeholders Meeting on 10 August 2010 to address the specific matters raised in my letter of 21 July 2010 and the overall lack of satisfactory progress in implementing the GSPA.
“This meeting was very much a “summit” meeting of all concerned in order to bring matters to a head in light of the difficulties to date in implementing the GSPA. Present at the meeting were Engineer Goni Sheikh, the Permanent Secretary to the Minister, Mrs. Grace Taiga, the Legal Director of the Ministry, Mr. Tijani, who was at this stage the Technical Assistant to the Minister, Engineer Ikejiani, the Special Technical Adviser to the Minister, Dr. Labi Ajibade, the Manager of Gas of NAPIMS, Dr. David Ige, the Group General Manager/Special Technical Adviser to NNPC, Mr. Sunday Babalola of the DPR, Mrs. Uno Adeniji, the General Manager of Planning, Gas and Petroleum of NNPC, Mr. Umar, Manager Gas and Petroleum, NNPC, Mr. Nuhu Tizhe, the Technical Adviser to the Group Managing Director of NNPC, Mrs. Belgore, the Assistant Legal Adviser to the Minister, and Mr. Debo Spaine of Addax. Mohammed Kuchazi and I attended on behalf of P&ID. A copy of the Minutes of the Meeting as provided by the Ministry is at pages 166 to 169 of MQ1.
“At the meeting I emphasized that, although NAPIMS had been of great assistance, there remained an urgent need to complete the modality arrangements for the take- off of Phase 1 of the project. NAPIMS pointed out that they were themselves working hard to ensure that the project took off “very soon”, and that they did not envisage any problem because OML 123 was a PSC and therefore the Government owned 100% of the gas within it.
